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   Cornell Law School  
  
 
 
 An anti-foreign-suit injunction is controversial  
because it constrains judicial proceedings in another 
sovereign country.  It does so indirectly by controlling the 
actions of private parties.  The enjoining court in one 
country (F1) orders a private litigant before it to suspend 
or terminate a legal proceeding in another country (F2) – 
on pain of sanctions that F1 will impose on the private 
party for disobedience.   Although formally there is no 
direct interference with, or order addressed to, a foreign 
judicial power, as a practical matter the effect in the 
foreign jurisdiction can be substantial.  If the enjoined 
party has assets in F1, or a thriving business there, or 
just attractive future business prospects in F1, it will not 
want to risk transgressing the F1 order.   Thus, the 
litigant will comply and terminate (or not initiate) legal 
proceedings in F2.    
 2
 
 As is well known, civil-law jurisdictions generally find 
anti-foreign-suit injunctions offensive, even violative of 
international law.1  On the other hand common-law 
jurisdictions, especially courts in the UK and US, 
consider an anti-foreign-suit injunction appropriate under 
some circumstances.  Although I agree with the view 
that courts should give considerable weight to 
“international comity” before issuing an anti-foreign-suit 
injunction and in general should use this remedy only 
sparingly, I argue in this essay that the remedy is 
appropriate and useful in a particular context.   
 
 That context arises where the parties have agreed 
to arbitrate disputes in F1 and have chosen F1 law to 
govern the arbitration agreement.  In that case I argue  
an F1 court should have discretion to issue an anti-
foreign-suit injunction to enforce the arbitration 
agreement. 
 
 I would make room for one major exception—where 
there are relatively strong (and appropriately applicable) 
public policy considerations in the alternative forum (F2) 
for avoiding the arbitration agreement.  Ordinary issues 
of fact finding or contract construction to decide, for 
                                                 
1 See judgment of the Oberlandesgericht [OLG] Düsseldorf [German Court of 
Appeal of Düsseldorf ] Jan. 10 1996 in Re the Enforcement of an English Anti-
Suit Injunction (quoted in relevant part in West Tankers, Inc. v. Ras Riunione 
Adriatica de Sicurta SpA, (2005) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 257; (2005) 2 All E. R. (Comm) 
240; 2005 WL 699582 (QBD (Comm Ct)).  See also Emmanuel Gaillard, Il Est 
Interdit d’Interdire: Réflexions sur l’Utilisation des Anti-Suit Injunctions dans 
l’Arbitrage Commercial International, 2004 Rev. Arb. at 47-62; Marco Stacher, 
You Don’t Want to Go There—Antisuit Injunctions in International Commercial 
Arbitration, 23 ASA Bulletin, at 644 – 645 (2005). Cf. Emmanuel Gaillard, ed., 
ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2005).  
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example, whether an arbitration agreement came into 
existence, would not suffice.  On the other hand, 
relatively strong public policy considerations embedded 
in F2 law for disallowing arbitration should be respected 
(to the extent of not being thwarted by an anti-suit 
injunction)—even if the parties’ preference for arbitration 
is clearly expressed.    
  
 Two closely related arguments support this 
approach.  First, the injunction merely effectuates the 
parties’ agreement to resolve all disputes through 
arbitration.   The enjoined party, if it invokes judicial 
proceedings in F2, does something that it promised not 
to do.   The injunction holds that party to its agreement.  
Second, the injunction is a particularly effective way of 
giving force to a principal goal of the New York 
Convention2—ensuring that international arbitration 
agreements are honored and enforced. 
 
 The opposing view rejects all (even indirect) 
interference with foreign legal proceedings, because it 
considers such interference an offense against 
sovereignty.  The injunction opponents do not disagree 
that parties should be held to their agreements and that 
arbitration agreements should be enforced.  They look 
instead, however, to the courts of F2 to make that 
determination, not exclusively those of F1.   
 
 If the controversy were left at this level of generality, 
one might wonder what all the fuss is about.  So many 
countries have become parties to the New York 
                                                 
2     U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S.  3 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
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Convention3 that the Convention’s support for enforcing 
arbitration agreements is now respected in all parts of 
the world.  So why should F2 care if an F1 court  issues 
an anti-suit injunction to enforce an arbitration 
agreement that F2 also has an obligation under the New 
York Convention to enforce?  The court in F1 is simply 
protecting the pro-arbitration litigant from incurring the 
unnecessary and wasteful expense of litigating once 
again, this time in F2, to enforce the arbitration 
agreement.  The parties presumably chose arbitration in 
the first place to avoid just such vexatious parallel 
proceedings in different national forums.   
 
 This way of looking at the problem, however, 
obscures the fundamental difficulty.  A dispute’s 
arbitrability is not always clear cut.  Sometimes the party 
opposed to arbitration resorts to F2 courts in open 
breach and complete disregard of the arbitration 
agreement.  This is the easy case, where not very much 
can be said against an injunction that holds a breaching 
party to its agreement.   At other times, however, the 
parties take different positions on whether their 
underlying dispute is in fact “arbitrable”—that is, whether 
an arbitration agreement (or an obligation to arbitrate) 
binding the two parties has actually come into existence; 
or whether, if it did come into existence, it is valid; or 
whether, if it did come into existence and is valid, a 
particular disputed issue is within the agreement’s 
scope.  These are the three fundamental issues of 
“arbitrability”:  existence, validity, and scope of the 
arbitration agreement.   
 
                                                 
3  There were 142 parties as of June 1, 2007.  See www.uncitral.org for the latest 
count.   
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 On these three questions, different legal systems 
may give different answers on the same basic set of 
facts.  Thus F1, applying its own choice-of-law rules, 
might decide that “X” law governs and that under that 
law the dispute is arbitrable.   But F2, applying its own 
(potentially different) choice of law rules, might decide 
that “Y” law applies and conclude that the dispute is not 
arbitrable.  Even if both courts apply the same law, they 
might apply the law differently or assess the facts 
differently and reach different results.   
 
 With this added complexity in view, one can 
understand why commentators and courts might object 
to an F1 order that seeks to control the outcome in F2.  
Indeed some commentators believe that the New York 
Convention can be invoked as authority opposed to anti-
foreign-suit injunctions—even where the injunction’s 
purpose is to enforce an arbitration agreement.  The 
claim is not so much that the New York Convention 
directly regulates the issue of parallel proceedings—
because it does not—but rather that the Convention’s 
structure and spirit contemplate and indirectly legitimize 
parallel proceedings and hence that anti-foreign-suit 
injunctions tend to clash with the logic and harmony of 
the Convention regime.     
 
 
The New York Convention and Anti-foreign-suit 
Injunctions 
 
 The anti-injunction argument proceeds as follows.4  
Article II of the New York Convention deals with a state’s 
                                                 
4  See Marco Stacher, You Don’t Want to Go There—Antisuit Injunctions in 
International Commercial Arbitration, 23 ASA Bulletin, at 647-649 (2005).  
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obligation to enforce an arbitration agreement.  The 
obligation is subject, however, to two qualifications.  
First, under Article II(3) a court need not refer parties to 
arbitration if it finds that the arbitration agreement is “null 
and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.”  
The issue here is whether the dispute is “arbitrable”.  
The court need not “refer the parties to arbitration” if it 
finds that the agreement is 1) non-existent or 2) invalid  
or 3) that the dispute is not within the agreement’s 
scope.  An existence question arises, for example, 
where one of the litigants may not be a party to the 
agreement (or otherwise bound by the arbitration 
obligation).  A validity question is in issue, for example, if 
a party argues that the arbitration agreement is not in 
writing or was induced by a misrepresentation.  A scope 
issue arises if the agreement’s language may not be 
broad enough to include the underlying merits-based 
dispute. Existence, validity and scope, then, are the 
central issues of what I will call “ordinary arbitrability”.   
 
 Second, the obligation applies only if, according the 
Article II(1), the arbitration agreement concerns “a 
subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.”   
This second  condition—that of what I prefer to call “non-
arbitrable subject matter”—could be seen as subsumed 
within the first (“ordinary arbitrability”), because it is 
simply a specific instance of an invalid arbitration 
agreement.  Because the issue turns heavily on public 
policy considerations, however, it is useful to treat it 
separately.    
 
 Article II does not say which state’s law should 
decide ordinary arbitrability (existence, validity, and 
scope).  Presumably a given court will apply it’s own 
 7
choice-of-law rules to decide what law governs these 
issues.  If the parties have specifically chosen a given 
state’s law to govern the arbitration agreement,5 
however, most choice-of-law systems will respect that 
choice.  Thus, in this situation—the one with which I am 
principally concerned (where the parties have chosen 
the law of the seat)—most states will apply the same law 
in deciding ordinary arbitrability (the law of the seat—
because that law was specifically chosen by the parties).  
Thus, where an F1 court, interpreting and applying its 
own, party-chosen law, finds a dispute arbitrable and 
enjoins a litigant from proceeding anew in F2, it is hard 
to see why F2 would be especially upset.  Presumably 
F2 would apply the same law and reach the same result 
as to arbitrability.  F2 could hardly quarrel with F1’s 
interpretation and application of F1’s own law.  The 
injunction merely saves the parties the additional and 
unnecessary expense of duplicative litigation. 6   
 
 Neither party autonomy nor uniform choice of law 
will apply, however, for the question of non-arbitrable 
subject matter (“non-arbitrability”).  Although Article II 
                                                 
5  Parties do not normally choose a law specifically to govern the arbitration 
clause.  Typically, instead, they include the choice-of-law clause in a different part of 
the contract and intend it to apply to the entire contract, including the arbitration 
clause.  If the parties do not include a choice-of-law clause in and for the arbitration 
clause itself, it seems reasonable to treat a choice-of-law clause included for the 
entire contract to apply as well to the arbitration clause.  This is all the more so when 
the parties choose that same state’s law as the lex arbitri (by choosing that state as 
the seat of the arbitration).  This of course is the special case with which this essay 
deals—the case in which the parties place the seat in F1 and also choose F1 law to 
govern the arbitration agreement. 
 
6  The parties could easily be understood to have agreed (by placing the seat in  F1 
and choosing F1 law) that F1  (and not F2) should decide any disputes over “ordinary 
arbitrability”.  Thus, an F1 anti-suit injunction could be seen as enforcing not only the 
parties’ agreement to arbitrate in F1, but also their implicit agreement to resolve 
ordinary arbitrability questions in F1 as well.   
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does not mention choice-of-law issues, Article V, dealing 
with enforcement of the award, does.  It provides in 
V(2)(a) that an award may be refused recognition and 
enforcement if it deals with a subject matter “not capable 
of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country 
[the enforcing country]; * * *”7  If one assumes, as seems 
reasonable—at least for the sake of consistency—that 
the lex fori rule of Article V (dealing with award 
enforcement) should also apply under Article II (dealing 
with agreement enforcement), then the Convention 
contemplates that courts in different states may reach 
different results on the issue of non-arbitrability—
different results that in a sense would be legitimate.      
 
 Thus, an injunction opponent would argue— 
persuasively I think—that when the dispute concerns the 
public-policy-infused issue of non-arbitrable subject 
matter, the Convention contemplates legitimately 
different outcomes in different national legal systems. It 
would go against the structure and spirit of the 
Convention, the injunction opponent would argue, for F1 
to enjoin a party from proceeding in F2, where F2 might 
consider that the subject matter has such a public impact 
that private ordering is excluded and the dispute is non-
arbitrable.   For example, the dispute could concern F2’s 
antitrust law, and for public policy reasons F2 might 
deem such issues non-arbitrable. The New York 
Convention clearly contemplates and legitimizes such an 
F2 reaction, leaving it to F2 to decide when non-
arbitrability applies.   
 
 One might even take this reasoning a step further 
(beyond the New York Convention) to argue that 
                                                 
7  Emphasis added.  
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whenever the dispute involves matters of legitimate 
public policy concern in F2, F1 should not enjoin a party 
from proceeding in F2.  Here the logic would be that 
“international comity” considerations are particularly 
strong when public policy issues are in play, and that it is 
particularly offensive for an F1 injunction to interfere with 
the safeguarding in F2 of its legitimate public policy 
concerns.  Indeed, approving an injunction in this setting 
might be seen as a form of collusion between F1 and  
private parties to evade F2’s mandatory, public-
regulatory law—law that F2 trusts only its judges to 
enforce, not arbitrators.      
 
 Up to this point in the discussion I would agree with 
the injunction opponents.  But this line of reasoning—
concerning non-arbitrable subject matter—does not 
extend to ordinary arbitrability issues that do not raise 
public-policy concerns—in particular to those involving 
ordinary contract enforcement issues concerning the 
existence, validity, and scope of the arbitration 
agreement.  On these matters it is difficult to find in the 
Convention any particular support for multiple parallel 
proceedings.  The Convention seems either neutral, or, if 
anything, might be cited in support of a system effecting 
strong enforcement of an arbitration agreement—given 
that making arbitration agreements fully enforceable is 
one of the Convention’s principal goals.   
 
 I believe this point comes home even more 
forcefully, if one applies it in the specific context I 
mentioned at the outset of this essay—where the parties 
have placed the seat of their arbitration in F1 and have 
chosen F1 law to govern the arbitration agreement.  In 
most of the jurisdictions of which I am aware, such an 
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agreement would provide good personal jurisdiction over 
both parties in F1 courts to enforce the arbitration 
agreement.8  If the pro-arbitration litigant seises an F1 
court seeking enforcement of the arbitration agreement 
and that court, applying its own law, finds the dispute 
arbitrable, why would it not be fully legitimate for the F1 
court to bar the anti-arbitration litigant from forum 
shopping to find a court that might reach a different 
result (or simply to impose further litigation costs on the 
pro-arbitration litigant)?  
 
 Indeed, it does not seem farfetched to cite the 
Convention’s basic agreement-enforcing policy as 
supporting an injunction remedy here.   By choosing an 
F1 seat and F1 law to govern their agreement, the 
parties can be seen to have agreed that F1 courts 
should decide all questions of ordinary arbitrability.   An 
injunction barring the arbitration opponent from 
proceeding in F2 merely enforces this aspect of the 
parties’ intentions.  Allowing the respondent to raise the 
arbitrability question anew in an F2 court (and thereby to 
impose on the pro-arbitration litigant the corresponding 
costs of such a proceeding), is just what the parties 
intended to avoid. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8  See, e.g., Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria Gen., 336 F.2d 354, 363 (2d Cir. 1964), 
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965) (“By agreeing to arbitrate in New York, where the 
United States Arbitration Act makes such agreements specifically enforceable, the 
Comisaria General must be deemed to have consented to the jurisdiction of the court 
that could compel the arbitration proceeding in New York.”);  Peter Schlosser, Anti-
suit injunctions zur Unterstützung von internationalen Schiedsverfahren, Recht 
der internationalen Wirtschaft, vol. 52. afl. 7, 486, at 491 (2006).  
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 A Forum for Strong Enforcement of an Arbitration 
Agreement  
 
 Consider the perspective of private parties 
negotiating an international transaction who want to 
include a reliable and fully enforceable arbitration 
agreement and who want to avoid parallel proceedings.  
Their contractual freedom is surely enhanced, if they 
know that a jurisdiction exists (F1) that will enjoin a 
parallel proceeding outside of F1 in breach of the 
arbitration agreement—at least if the seat is in F1 and 
F1 law applies.   The parties then have the freedom to 
select this system of strong enforcement by drafting their 
agreement to place the seat in F1 and to choose F1 law 
to govern the arbitration agreement.  This method will 
not allow them to evade appropriately applicable foreign 
mandatory law—the kind of law that defines non-
arbitrable subject matter.  But otherwise they can count 
on a strongly enforceable arbitration agreement.   
 
 If there were no such forum, might we not expect 
private interests dependent on global transactions to 
lobby governments for an arbitration law that would 
serve this end?  Is this not how we got Article II of the 
New York Convention in the first place—through private 
interests articulating the need for a treaty regime 
guaranteeing the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements?  In this sense I think it is fair to cite the 
New York Convention’s pro-enforcement policy goal as 
at least not inconsistent with—and, in fact, more or less 
supportive of—anti-foreign-suit injunctions to enforce 
arbitration agreements (under the conditions discussed).  
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Case Law in the US and UK Favoring Anti-foreign-suit 
Injunctions to Enforce Arbitration Agreements 
  
 Currently the courts of the US, and especially those 
of the UK, are prepared to act as strongly enforcing 
jurisdictions.  In the US even the Second Circuit, which 
generally favors a restrictive approach to anti-foreign-suit 
injunctions,9 has been willing to issue an injunction to 
enforce an arbitration agreement—at least where the 
seat was in the US and US law governed the arbitration 
agreement.  Although other factors played a role, the 
Second Circuit in Paramedics v. GE Medical Systems10 
cited the strong federal policy in favor of enforcing 
arbitration agreements as helping to overcome 
“international comity” concerns and justifying an 
injunction.  In another case, Pepsico v. Oficina Central, 11 
where the parties put the seat in New York but chose 
Venezuelan law to govern the arbitration agreement, the 
New York federal district court refused to enjoin a 
parallel proceeding in Venezuela challenging 
arbitrability.12  After all, the parties had chosen 
Venezuelan law to determine arbitrability; so it was 
appropriate for a Venezuelan court to be the principal 
                                                 
9   See Goss Int’l Corp. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft, 491 F.3d 
355, 359  (8th Cir. 2007) (listing the First, Second, Third, Sixth, and District of 
Columbia Circuits as following a “conservative approach“ and the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits, a “liberal approach” to anti-foreign-suit injunctions). 
 
10  See Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial, Ltda. v. GE Medical Sys. Info. 
Techs, Inc., 369 F.3d 645 (2d Cir. 2004) (seat was in Miami and New York law 
applied, see 2003 WL 23641529 (S.D.N.Y., 2003)). 
  
11  Pepsico, Inc v. Oficina Central de Asesoria Y Ayuda Tecnica, C.A., 945 F.Supp. 
69 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).   
 
12  See also, LAIF X SPRL v. Axtel, 390 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2004) (refusal to enjoin 
parallel proceedings in Mexico where arbitrability would be decided under Mexican 
law).       
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interpreter of what the outcome should be under its own 
law.  
 
 Two recent UK cases, Through Transport 13 and 
West Tankers,14 are especially illustrative of the 
approach I am urging.  Through Transport involved loss 
of cargo shipped from India through Finland to Moscow.  
New India, the cargo insurer, paid and was subrogated 
to cargo’s claim against the carrier, but the carrier was 
insolvent.  All was not lost, however, because the carrier 
had liability insurance, and Finland had enacted a direct 
action statute allowing a creditor to bypass the insolvent 
debtor and sue the liability insurer directly.  This is what 
New India elected to do, by suing in Finland on a theory 
that the loss-causing event occurred there and that 
Finnish courts thus had good jurisdiction.  
 
 New India had a particular reason for suing in 
Finland under the Finnish direct action statute rather 
than in the UK under the equivalent UK statute.  The 
carrier’s liability insurance contract contained a “pay to 
be paid” clause obligating the insurer to pay only if the 
insured had previously paid on a covered claim (an 
indemnity contract).  The “pay to be paid” clause was 
enforceable in English law but arguably not so under 
Finnish law.  The Finnish statute contained anti-evasion 
provisions that potentially voided both the “pay to be 
paid” clause and the arbitration clause (on a theory of 
                                                 
13  Through Transp. Mut. Ins. Ass’n  v. New India Assurance Ass’n,  [2005] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 67 ; [2005] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 715; 2004 WL 2714108 (CA (Civ Div)). 
  
14  West Tankers Inc v. Ras Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta, [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 257; 
[2005] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 240; 2005 WL 699582 (QBD (Comm Ct)) (affirmed by the 
House of Lords, but  the House of Lords referred  to the European Court of Justice  
the question of  the legality of the anti-suit injunction under possibly applicable EU 
law, 20007 WL 504700; see note 15 infra).   
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non-arbitrable subject matter). Thus, Finnish public 
policy seemed to offer New India a chance at recovery 
for a loss caused in Finland.   
 
 The liability insurance contract (including the 
arbitration clause) was governed by English law  and  
provided for arbitration in London.  Not liking its 
prospects in Finland, Through Transport, the liability 
insurer, sued New India in the UK seeking arbitration 
and an injunction barring New India from continuing with 
the Finnish action.  The Court of Appeal ordered 
arbitration, reasoning that under English law (which it 
found applicable) New India could not enforce the claim 
stemming from the liability insurance contract without 
honoring that contract’s arbitration clause once Through 
Transport invoked it.   
 
 At the same time the court refused to enjoin New 
India from continuing with its Finnish action. The court 
reasoned that by suing in Finland New India did not 
“breach” the arbitration agreement, to which it was not a 
party.  Its obligation to arbitrate came about through 
operation of law, not through its specific agreement to 
arbitrate.   But the court also stressed the role of Finnish 
public policy.  The Finnish law was not entirely clear, but 
it was certainly arguable that Finnish public policy 
stemming from the anti-evasion provisions of its direct 
action statute would annul both the “pay to be paid” and 
arbitration clauses.  The importance of this public policy 
element becomes clearer when one compares the 
outcome in the West Tankers case.  
 
 West Tankers is an analogous case but with a 
crucial difference and an opposite result on the 
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injunction issue.  There the oil-tanker carrier rammed 
and damaged the charterer’s wharf in Italy.  Erg, the 
wharf insurer, paid and was subrogated to the wharf 
owner/charterer’s claim.  Erg sued West Tankers, the 
ship owner, in Italy on a tort theory for damage to the 
wharf.   West Tankers, preferring arbitration, sued Erg in 
the UK to enforce the arbitration clause and for an 
injunction ordering Erg to dismiss its Italian action.  The 
charterparty, under which the oil tanker operated, 
provided for English law and London arbitration.  The 
key questions were whether Erg was bound by the 
arbitration provisions of the charterparty, to which it was 
not a party, and whether UK or Italian law should decide 
that issue.   
 
 The court ruled that UK law applied, that Erg was 
required to honor the arbitration clause, and that the 
clause was broad enough to include the tort claim for 
wharf damage (governed substantively by Italian law).  
In dictum the court also concluded that Italian law would 
have reached the same result. Under neither law, 
however, was Erg a formal party to the arbitration 
agreement.  Therefore Erg did not breach that 
agreement by suing in Italy—which was one of the 
prominent reasons the Through Transport  court gave for 
not enjoining prosecution of the parallel proceeding in 
that case.  Still, having decided the “ordinary arbitrability 
question” in favor of arbitration, the West Tankers court 
enjoined Erg from continuing with the Italian 
proceeding.15  Although the court noted that the Italian 
                                                 
15  On appeal the House of Lords agreed with the Commercial Court’s decision to 
grant the injunction, but referred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) the question 
whether the Turner v. Grovit principle would apply to disallow the anti-suit injunction. 
The Turner v. Grovit principle prohibits an EU member state from enjoining the 
prosecution of a claim in another EU member state. See Turner v. Grovit, C-159/02, 
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court might well object to the UK anti-suit injunction and 
refuse to enforce it, none of the litigants claimed  that 
Italian public policy was involved in any way or that the 
subject matter was non-arbitrable in Italy.16   
 
 Although the West Tankers court  did not distinguish 
Through Transport on the specific ground for which I am 
arguing—the presence or absence of public policy 
concerns in the parallel jurisdiction—I believe that 
distinction provides a good explanation for the conflicting 
outcomes.  In neither case did filing a claim in the 
parallel jurisdiction constitute a breach of the arbitration 
agreement.  So this factor cannot explain the different 
outcomes.  In Through Transport—where the injunction 
was refused—the Court of Appeal noted the importance 
of not interfering with parallel prosecution of the 
plausible claim that Finnish mandatory law (public policy) 
would void the “pay-to-be-paid” clause (and even the 
arbitration clause) under the  Finnish direct action 
                                                                                                                                                        
Judgment of the European Court of Justice of April 27, 2004. Turner v. Grovit was 
based, however, on considerations stemming from the EU’s jurisdiction and 
judgments regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters OJ L 12, 16.1.2001, p. 1-23 (the so-called “Brussels Regulation”)), which is 
not applicable to “arbitration”.  The preliminary reference to the ECJ in West Tankers 
is still pending before the ECJ.  The West Tankers case is likely to be best known in 
the future for the answer the ECJ gives to this important question.  
 
16  For a similar result, see “Epsilon Rosa” (No. 2) [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 701 (Com. 
Ct.), where, after complex analysis, the UK court concluded that the bill of lading 
cross-referenced and hence incorporated the charterparty arbitration clause 
(choosing UK law and a UK arbitral seat).  The court acknowledged that the parallel 
proceeding in Poland might not have reached the same result on the arbitrability 
question, but still enjoined that proceeding.  Note that the Polish proceeding involved 
an ordinary arbitrability issue (existence of an arbitration agreement), not questions of 
non-arbitrable subject matter or other Polish public policy concerns.  The Epsilon 
Rosa court found that language in the bill of lading clearly put the cargo claimant on 
notice that the referenced charterparty’s arbitration clause and applicable law were to 
be incorporated.  Thus, the result accords with the theory that the parties had agreed 
upon the UK as the forum to resolve ordinary arbitrability issues, since the 
charterparty clause implicitly so provided.    
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statute.  In West Tankers—where the injunction issued— 
there were no public policy questions at stake in the 
enjoined Italian proceeding.   
  
 One could think of other patterns where this public 
policy distinction would come into play.  For example, 
suppose a Belgian distributor agrees to distribute an 
American manufacturer’s products in Belgium, and the 
parties include an arbitration clause, choosing English 
law to govern the clause, and arbitration in London.  
Under Belgian mandatory law a Belgian distributor’s 
claim for an extended termination period and 
compensation (both provided for in Belgian statutory 
law) is non-arbitrable subject matter.17 If the parties fall 
into dispute over termination of the agreement, a British 
court would probably order arbitration, but it should not 
enjoin the Belgian party from pursuing its claim in 
Belgian courts under Belgian mandatory law.  Under 
Belgian law—designed to protect Belgian distributors—
the Belgian distributor’s claim is non-arbitrable subject 
matter.  It would constitute an unsupportable disturbance 
of international comity (perhaps triggering a counter anti-
suit injunction) for a British court to enjoin a Belgian 
distributor from suing in a Belgian court for protection  
under fully applicable Belgian public policy.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 In summary I have argued in favor of a pro-
arbitration use of anti-foreign-suit injunctions to enforce 
                                                 
17 See Audi–NSU Auto Union A.G. v. S.A. Adelin Petit & Cie, Cour de Cassation 
(1979), 5 Yearbk. Comm. Arb’n 257 (1980).  For the major provisions of the Belgian 
statute, which are quoted in English translation and discussed, see Audi–NSU Auto 
Union A.G. v. S.A. Adelin Petit & Cie, Cour d’appel de Liege, 4 Yearbk. Comm. Arb’n 
254, 255-56, nn. 2, 3 and 7 (1979)). 
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arbitration agreements where the injunction would not  
interfere with legitimate public policy interests (making 
the dispute non-arbitrable) in the parallel jurisdiction.   
Where the dispute involves ordinary issues of 
arbitrability (existence, validity, and scope) and the 
parties have chosen an arbitration seat and that seat’s 
law to govern the arbitration agreement, a court at the 
seat should be free to enforce the agreement and enjoin 
the respondent from breaching it through parallel 
litigation elsewhere.  Issuance of an anti-foreign-suit 
injunction in this situation should not be seen as 
infringing international comity (much less, international 
law).   
  
 This result seems fair and reasonable; indeed I 
believe it accords with the basic policy of the New York 
Convention and with what global economic actors would 
want to have available for their dispute settlement 
arrangements.  It also seems conceivable that the 
availability of strong enforcement remedies for arbitration 
agreements in the US and UK (and other common-law 
jurisdictions) will make these venues all the more 
attractive to parties seeking a reliable and cost-saving 
seat of arbitration.  If that prediction turns out to be 
accurate, might we not expect the arbitration bar itself in 
countries now opposed to anti-suit injunctions to align 
themselves with this essay’s arguments and to urge their 
own courts to employ this remedy in suitable cases18—or 
risk a decline in their arbitration business.   
 
                                                 
18  Schlosser makes essentially this point, see Schlosser, supra note 8, at 487, as 
does Lord Hoffman in his opinion for the House of Lords in West Tankers, supra note 
14, at 20-21.   
